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They were careless people ... - they smashed up things and creatures and 
then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness . .. and let other 
people clean up the mess they had made . . . . 
F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (1925). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of multinational corporate activity in devel-
oping countries has recently given rise to debate about the respon-
sibility of multinational corporations (MNCs) to the host country 
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Cambridge Cniversity, Cambridge England; LL.M. Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 
USA. The author wishes to thank the following people for their support and comments in 
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and its citizens. l Many MNCs have become at least as powerful as 
some of the states in which they function and are therefore in the 
same position as states to violate the full range of human rights. 
MNCs must therefore be held accountable for human rights viola-
tions to the same extent as states. The operations of MNCs in 
developing countries have expanded and changed so as to have a 
more direct impact on the lives of the local population and envi-
ronment. The human harms resulting from MNC activities, ranging 
from environmental pollution to human casualties, are violative of 
existing human rights formulations. 
This paper will examine the issue of mass disasters resulting 
from the ultrahazardous activities of MNCs to exemplify the power 
of these corporations to inflict serious human harms and to intro-
duce the concept of using the discourse of human rights to disci-
pline MNC activities. Traditional private tort law is ill-equipped to 
deal with mass disasters resulting from ultrahazardous activities 
engaged in by MNCs and ineffective in censuring their disregard 
for human life in the conduct of their activities in developing coun-
tries. The legal battles, following such mass disasters, have been 
trapped in a legal paralysis and conceptual vacuum, exemplified by 
the long, drawn out litigation fought pursuant to the December 
1984 catastrophe at Bhopal, India. 
The objective of this article is to illustrate how international 
human rights law ought to be enforceable against MNCs in these 
situations as they have emerged as powerful actors in the interna-
tional arena, endowed with the ability to inflict harm and violate 
human rights. MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous activities are in a 
position to infringe upon the right to life and liberty. In order to 
hold them accountable for the violation of this right, the liability of 
I There are numerous definitions of multinational corporations, W. FELD, NONGOVERN-
MENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS - A STUDY OF BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICAL GROUPS 
22-23 (1972). The definition to be adopted herein is as follows: A multinational corporation 
is an entity which exercises direct or indirect control either through subsidiaries or majorities 
on the board of directors in different parts of the world. The definition is expressed in broad 
terms because a strict construction of the term would enable MNCs to limit their liability by 
erecting subsidiaries in the host country. The definition, therefore, includes the reality of 
such situations where control is actually exercised by a corporate entity in another country 
(see deeming provision Indian Companies Act, 1956 § 4). Therefore, even though a MNC 
may not have a majority sharcholding in its subsidiary, it may still exercise control through 
the board of directors by offering incentives that render the directors beholden to the parent 
company. Whether the top management is situated in one headquarter company or divided 
into zones and separate headquarters established by each zone, the units situated in different 
countries are joined together by ties of common ownership or control and share a common 
management strategy. 
1990] MNC ACCOUNTABILITY 3 
MNCs must be determined according to the impact of their activi-
ties, without requiring proof of intention. In order to ensure effec-
tive relief, the victims of mass disasters must be able to secure 
damages for the violation of a human right. To fully guarantee and 
recognize the value of the right, the damages must be punitive, 
expressed in terms of the defendant's capacity to pay. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF MNCs AS PUBLIC ACTORS 
International law has begun to recognize that a state-centered 
orientation is no longer sufficient for understanding the complex-
ities of an increasingly interdependent world order.2 This recogni-
tion stems from the growth of the economic and political power of 
MNCs and the increasing complexity of their operations. 3 Their 
growth has in turn endowed them with the power and ability to 
inflict serious harm in the environments in which they operate. 
International law has thus been forced to take notice of these entities 
and has begun to formulate ways of securing them to a uniform 
standard of behavior. 
There is little doubt that MNCs have made, and are still mak-
ing, a significant contribution to the economic development of de-
veloping countries.4 MNCs have the ability to participate in the 
integration of the world economy and promote economic and social 
development. The activities of MNCs have expanded quite rapidly, 
and they have acquired immense economic and technological 
power. 5 Although their positive contribution to the world's devel-
opment process has been recognized, their negative effects have 
been the focus of some concern to the international community. 
MNCs have accumulated vast amounts of power as a result of the 
2 See Lutz, Remarks on Private and Public Regulation in the United States and Inter-
national Community, at the Meeting of the International Bar Association's Section on Busi-
ness Law, ]\;ew York, (Sept. 16, 1986) (on file with the author) (which provides an overview 
of the dimensions of the problem, the existing law in the U.S. and identifies the challenge 
for bringing international tort claims in U.S. courts). 
3 See L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, O. SCHACHTER & H. SCHMIT, INTERKATIONAL LAW 344 
(1987). See also T.]. BIERSTEKER, THE LIMITS OF STATE POWER IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD 
ECONOMY, 147-76 (H. Shue and P.G. Brown 1981) (discusses the relative loss of control and 
autonomy of the nation state). 
4 See Kolvenbach, European Reflections on Bhopal and the Consequences for Transnational 
CU1porations 14 INT'L Bus. LAW 357 (1986). 
5 See SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93RD CONG., 1ST 
SESS., THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 393 App. A, 404 (1973) 
(found that of all nation-states and corporations, the largest 99 economic entities included 
40 corporations). 
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expansion of their activities from extractive industries into those 
intervening more directly in the lives of the local population. Their 
increase in power has generated concern over their increased po-
tential to inflict human harms and their accountability for such 
harms. For example, workers employed in the factories of MNCs 
are frequently exposed to substandard working conditions;6 the 
environment and surrounding communities are threatened by the 
ultrahazardous activities engaged in by some MNCs which are not 
secured by adequate safety mechanisms;7 local farmers are arbi-
trarily dispossessed of their land by multinational agribusiness cor-
porations and reduced to the status of laborers;8 and, MNCs have 
also colluded with repressive regimes, perpetuating the violation of 
civil and political freedoms. 9 
This discussion raises concerns about the human rights ac-
countability of MNCs. These concerns can be appreciated by ana-
lyzing the progress of the Bhopal litigation and the legal dilemmas 
encountered in determining the liability of MNCs engaged in ultra-
hazardous activities in developing countries that result in mass di-
sasters. 
III. BHOPAL: A CASE STUDY 
The Bhopal case arose out of the death and injury caused by 
the release of lethal gas known as methyl isocyanate from a chemical 
plant operated by Union Carbide, a multinational corporation 
which has worldwide operations. The release occurred in Bhopal, 
a township situated in the state of Madya Pradesh, India. 10 The 
accident resulted in the deaths of over 2,000 persons and injuries 
of over 200,000. 
fi See D. DEMBO, C.]. DIAS, A. KADWANI & W. MOREHOUSE, NOTHING TO LOSE BUT OUR 
LIVES: EMPOWERMENT TO OPPOSE INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD (1988). 
7Id. 
S See M. Nevile and R. Archer, Report of a Visit to the Plantation at Loreto and San 
Francisco in Gusan Del Sur, Mindanao, (November 5-14, 1984). See also A. Dubs, and C. 
Moynihan, The CDC and Mindanao, Report of a Visit to the Philippines, (September 21-
October 1, 1983) (both reports available at the International Center for Law in Development, 
777 U.S. Plaza, New York). 
9 See generally Girvan, Economic Nationalists v. Multinational Corporations: Revolutionary or 
Evolutionary Change? in MULTINATIONAL FIRMS IN AFRICA 26 (C. Widstrand ed. 1975). 
10 Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), incorporated under the laws of the United States, 
owned 50.9% of the stock in Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). A further 22% was owned 
or controlled by the Government of India and the balance held publicly. UCC was engaged 
in the manufacture of a variety of products, including chemicals, plastics, fertilizers and 
insecticides, at 14 plants in India. 
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After the accident, the victims and their families sought to 
invoke the jurisdiction of United States' courts by arguing that the 
headquarters of Union Carbide were situated in New York and that 
the Indian judicial system was not adequately equipped to deal with 
such a situation. Union Carbide filed a motion to dismiss the action 
on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted 
this motion and dismissed the action. I I By refusing to allow the 
Indian government to invoke the jurisdiction of the American 
courts, the quantum of damages was directly affected. In effect, the 
court protected the defendant MNC from exposure to damages on 
a scale which would normally be granted by the U.S. courts by 
dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens .12 The 
Indian government's argument was based primarily on its concern 
that it be able to enforce effectively any decree in its favor against 
II See In Re: Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Decem-
ber, 1984, 809 F.2d 195 (1987). 
12 A complete discussion of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper, but it has 
been discussed by many commentators in elaborate detail. The doctrine has recently been 
introduced into multinational corporate litigation as a successful weapon in the hands of 
MNCs to insulate them from high damage awards. The doctrine, as it has evolved, has no 
constructive role to play in multinational corporate litigation. 
In the Bhopal case, the defendant was able to successfully employ the doctrine to prevent 
the plaintiffs from invoking the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. The doctrine invariably affects 
the quantum of damages in so far as it protects the MNC from exposure to damages on a 
scale which would normally be granted by U.S. courts. If the plaintiffs had succeeded in 
invoking the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, any decision to apply Indian law would not affect 
the quantum of damages as it is part of the procedural law of the forum. Furthermore, if 
MNCs are under an obligation to observe and respect human rights, the doctrine, as em-
ployed in recent multinational corporate litigation, deprives the potential litigant of an 
effective remedy when her right is violated. It encourages MNCs to escape their obligation 
by simply setting up subsidiaries in the developing countries. The doctrine originally evolved 
to prevent extreme abuses of forum shopping. It has since developed from an almost hopeless 
motion to dismiss an action, into a frequently successful technique for delay. It has ceased 
to be the instrument of justice it was originally designed to be and has become preoccupied 
with the convenience of the parties. Convenience should be a diminishing concern in an age 
of expanding and vastly improved means of communication and transportation. For an 
elaborate analysis of the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in multinational 
litigation see generally I. LESHAM, FORUM NON CONVENIENS (1985); see also Stein, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1985) (discussing 
the defects in the doctrine and its irrational development); see Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum 
Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12 
(1949) (discussing how the doctrine was used mainly to permit discretionary circumvention 
of formal venue rules by trial judges); see also Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 908, 930 (1947) (describing the doctrine as amorphous and serving inconsistent 
ends); see also Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 416 
(1955) (describing the doctrine as "notoriously complex and uncertain," resulting in appalling 
delays in selecting the appropriate forum). 
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the defendant. 13 Most of Union Carbide's assets are situated in the 
United States. Carbide's assets in India amount to approximately 
eighty million U.S. dollars, an amount insufficient to satisfy any 
decree that might be rendered against it. Consequently, if the suit 
were to be filed in India, it would render any decree obtained a 
mere paper decree. 14 
As the case was sent back to India, the pressure on the defen-
dant for settlement was not as forceful due to the diminished threat 
of a high damages award and the lack of pressure from the Amer-
ican public. The litigation of the case in the Indian forum enhanced 
the defendant's bargaining power and ultimately forced a settle-
ment for an amount far below that which would have been obtained 
had the case been litigated in the United States. 
IV. THE DILEMMA 
The American experience and the very recent Indian experi-
ence with mass tort cases exposes the limitations of traditional tort 
law. The following section will examine these limitations and at-
tempt to illustrate the extent to which these limitations are indicative 
of a broader systemic dilemma underlying the tort law. 
A. Indian Tort Law 
Until the Bhopal case, Indian tort law had never been con-
fronted with the dilemmas posed by mass disaster situations. In 
India the development of tort law was frustrated to the point that 
it was unable to deal with ordinary tortious situations let alone mass 
disasters. 15 The Indian common law system inherited from the Brit-
ish was designed to serve the interests of the rulers rather than 
13 See Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Ordinance 1985 (promulgated 
on February 20, 1985 to enable the Indian Government to act as parens patriae on behalf of 
the Bhopal victims). 
14 The decree would have to be enforced in American courts, a procedure which could 
be resisted by a due process plea by the defendants. 
15 In fact, the main argument before the district court of New York in the Bhopal case 
on the forum non conveniens motion was not that I ndian law was less favorable than the chosen 
American law. This factor on its own cannot defeat a motion for dismissal on the basis of 
forum non conveniens. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Instead, it focused 
on the institutional incapacity of the system to deal with such a mass disaster. See also U. 
BAXI, INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE 13 (1986). 
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respond to the needs of the Indian people. 16 Legislation was enacted 
by the Parliament in London, and the highest court of appeal was 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
Although the legal system has largely succeeded in freeing itself 
from the colonial taint in the public law domain through the de-
velopment of its constitutional law, the same is not true regarding 
the development of its private law. Since independence, judicial 
resources and energies have been channeled primarily into devel-
oping and expanding the area of constitutional law much to the 
neglect of ordinary civil litigation. 17 The courts have been preoc-
cupied with checking government abuse and arbitrariness gener-
ated by the existence of a highly regulated state. Parties are able to 
approach the highest courts directly with a petition asking that the 
court either invalidate legislation or set aside an administrative or-
der that contravenes the petitioner's fundamental rights. Rigorous 
judicial review of governmental action and elaboration of the juris-
prudence of fundamental rights has been made possible by divert-
ing resources from private law areas and postponing the reform or 
rapid development of that area of the law. IS 
The emphasis on the development of the public law has there-
fore impeded the growth of tort law in India. There have been no 
16 See Some Aspects of Indian Law Today, I.C.L.Q., Supplementary Publication No.8 
(1964); U. BAXI, THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1981); Sharma, The Lack of Tort 
Law in India, 1966 A.I.R.]. 7. 
17 This development has been influenced by a colonial prejudice against lower courts 
which were mostly run by Indians. A system for interlocutory appeals was established which 
enabled the British-dominated superior courts to monitor the lower courts. See supra note 
16; Fazal Ali]., Sha Babulal Khimji v.Jayaben D. Kania, 1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1786 at 1817. 
After independence, the liberal access afforded to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of 
the Indian Constitution has perpetuated this system. The article occurs in the Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights and confers a fundamental right to move the Supreme Court by ap-
propriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights. It confers powers on the 
Supreme Court to issue any directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of such funda-
mental rights. 
In addition, in their endeavour to discourage civil litigation, the British passed a series 
of acts culminating in the Indian Court Fees Act 1870. The Act obliges plaintiffs in civil 
cases to pay court fees which are, at times, exorbitant. The effect was to discourage civil 
litigation for monetary damages and to divert claims to requests for equitable relief, such as 
injunctions, or finding a way to use the criminal court to redress a civil wrong. For a more 
elaborate discussion see U. BAXI, supra note 16; Sharma, supra note 16. 
Furthermore, the tort law was left uncodified by the British even though all other fields 
of criminal, commercial and procedural law were almost completely codified by 1882, for 
fear that it would encourage tort litigation. A perusal of the Civil Justice Committee report, 
known as the Rankin Committee Report, 1924-25 at .'133-36 appears in fact to have made 
a conscious decision to forestall the development of tort law in India, which was acquiring a 
modern industrial technology and products with injury producing potential. 
18 See Ramamoorthy, Difficulties afTort Litigants in India, 12]. IND. L. INST. at 320 (1970). 
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significant doctrinal developments in tort law. The Indian Supreme 
Court has addressed only a handful of tort cases since its establish-
ment in 1950. There are only 132 negligence cases reported in the 
All India Reports from 1914 to 1965. 19 These cases involved neither 
injuries related to industrial processes, nor the use of any hazardous 
chemical substances, nor complex technology. The limited number 
of tort cases that were filed since independence were mainly preoc-
cupied with traffic injuries and fatalities under the provisions of the 
Motor Vehicles Act. The cases are concerned with private risks, 
usually involving two parties, where the effect of the activity is 
immediately determinable and the damages are quantifiable. Such 
cases cannot provide an effective analogy or precedent to deal with 
the potential injuries introduced by new technology, which fre-
quently result in mass harm which is not immediately ascertainable 
and, therefore, difficult to quantify in terms of damages. 
Therefore, the tort law is not adequately developed to deal with 
and provide an effective remedy for scientific and technical hazards/ 
disasters of the kind which occurred in Bhopal. These deficiencies 
should not enable MNCs to escape from their liabilities when it 
involves the violation of human rights, in particular the violation of 
the right to life. 
B. United States Tort Law 
In recent years, American courts have entertained an unprec-
edented number of claims generated by mass exposure to hazardous 
or toxic substances. 2o The size and complexity of the claims have 
exposed the inability of the traditional tort law to deal with such 
cases.21 The American tort law regime is also incapable of dealing 
19Id. 
20 See In Re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig .• 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); In re "Agent Orange" 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., No. C84-
154M, (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 1984). 
21 See SENATE COMM. ON ENVTL AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND 
DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, 
Part I, Report and Comments 193 (Comm. Print 1982): 
Available remedies are inadequate in view of the substantial number of claims that 
may arise, and the factual and legal complexities that will be involved in their 
litigation .... [EJxisting legal remedies and actions ... (are) inadequate ... to deal 
with the possibility of mass torts, or multiple exposures, and with claims by hundreds 
of victims .... 
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effectively with mass tort situations.22 This failure is due in part to 
the lack of development of a unifying federal standard to address 
such situations.23 Even if such a standard were to develop, however, 
it could nevertheless be evaded by MNCs. 
At the federal level, numerous environmental protection stat-
utes have been enacted to protect individuals from exposure to 
toxic and hazardous substances.24 Although these statutes impose 
liability for cleanup and civil penalties, they do not compensate 
individuals injured by such substances. 25 Furthermore, these stat-
utes often preempt the application of federal common law.26 Similar 
22 See generally R.A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982). 
23 See Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for 
Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167 (1985) (discusses the possibility of creating a 
federal common law to displace state law in multi-tort cases). 
24 Congress has enacted numerous statutes that recognize the hazardous potential of 
new technology to harm the environment and in turn affect the quality of life. For example, 
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), authorizes the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") to declare air quality standards that will limit 
the concentration of air pollutants. The provisions of the Act can be enforced by adminis-
trative orders issued by the EPA and through the initiation of civil actions for injunctive 
relief and civil penalties. Even private citizens are authorized to commence civil actions to 
enjoin persons from violating the emission limitations articulated under the statute. Other 
examples include the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. V 1982), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984), which are both designed to control pollution from 
ongoing industrial operations. These statutes deal with pollution control and destruction of 
the environment and are aimed at protecting public health and welfare. These efforts 
represent a continuing attempt to balance the needs of an industrial society to consume 
natural resources and dispose of waste materials with the interest in protecting individual 
health, safety and property. This process has been described as "risk management" which 
accepts that certain risks are inevitably created by hazardous technology. It aims to adopt 
preventive and remedial policies to mitigate the unfair distribution of costs and benefits 
resulting from the adoption and application of such technology. See Jasanoff, Judicial Gate-
keeping in the Management of Hazardous Technologies (Working Paper, Programme on 
Science, Technology and Society, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York) (on file with author) 
(for further elaboration of the concept of risk management and cost benefit analysis). 
25 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I 
(1981), and California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). In both of these cases, the Supreme 
Court held that private tort remedies fell outside the scope of the legislative intent of the 
relevant statutes. 
26 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Supreme Court held that the 
Clean Water Act preempted a federal common law nuisance action for water pollution). 
Federal courts subsequently followed this lead and held that the Clean Air Act preempted 
federal common law nuisance action for air pollution. See United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 
F. Supp. 699, 701-02 (D. N.J. 1982). See also City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 
F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that federal statutes preempted federal common law 
remedies for hazardous waste disposal). But see United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. 
Supp. 802, 806-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Glicksman, Federal Pre-emption and Private Legal Remedies 
for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1985). 
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deficiencies exist in state statutes dealing with ultrahazardous or 
dangerous activities, which perform a regulatory as opposed to a 
compensatory function. 27 
State common law, therefore, affords the only real avenue of 
redress for the victims. An analysis of state law reveals that there 
have been divergent attempts by state courts to expand concepts 
existing in the traditional tort law to deal with the dilemmas posed 
by mass torts resulting from ultrahazardous activities. This disparate 
approach at the state law level exposes a common underlying ten-
sion between traditional tort law, conceptualized in terms of indi-
vidual responsibility and justice and equipped to deal with tradi-
tional two-party accidents, and a conception of collective 
responsibility and justice which provides a more appropriate and 
effective response to the risks of contemporary technology. 
This tension is reflected in the application of various standards 
for liability and causation in mass tort situations. For example, in 
employing a negligence standard in mass torts situations, the pri-
mary impediment is that the plaintiff may find it difficult to prove 
unreasonable conduct. The risks resulting from exposure to haz-
ardous substances are often not known prior to the accident. 28 It is 
therefore difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the risks were 
foreseeable or that reasonable alternatives were available. 
Alternatively, the application of strict liability for ultrahazar-
dous activities or abnormally dangerous activities within the confines 
of tort law has also proved inadequate.29 The application of strict 
liability is advantageous insofar as it relieves the plaintiff of the 
burden of proving that the defendant's activity was negligent. Ac-
cordingly, when the activity is abnormally dangerous and causes 
injury, the defendant will be liable even if her conduct was reason-
able. 3D 
27 See Johns and Seltzer, Toxic Torts: Theories of Liability, PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF 
COMPLEX TOXIC CHEMICAL OR HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE 1986 (316 PLI LIT 317, PLI Order 
No. H4-5006 Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, Litigation) 
(which analyzes the deficiencies in the remedies available at both federal and state levels to 
deal with mass torts and concludes that the burden is on the attorneys to develop a body of 
tort law to accommodate the needs of the victims of mass disasters and to secure full and 
fair recovery). Even those statutes providing compensation restrict recovery to the point that 
it is of limited utility. See Alaska Stat. § 46.03.822 (1989); Cal. Health and Safety Code 
§§ 25370-25395 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989). 
28 For further elaboration of this issue, see Ginsberg and Weiss, Common Law Liability for 
Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859,889-92,896-99 (1981). 
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976). 
30 See id. § 520, Comment h. 
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The problem is that the doctrine of strict liability has not been 
uniformly adopted by the states. Furthermore, it requires the plain-
tiff to convince the court that the toxic injury arose from an ultra-
hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. The courts have to 
balance a number of factors in determining this issue.31 The bal-
ancing test effectively transfers the standard into a de facto negli-
gence standard. 32 Finally, the courts have applied the standards 
inconsistently and have been unpredictable in determining whether 
an activity qualifies as an abnormally dangerous activity.33 Never-
theless, the application of a strict liability standard is a more attrac-
tive standard in mass disasters because it may be easier to establish 
than any other cause of action. 
A complete discussion of the problems raised by causation is 
beyond the scope of this paper. A number of commentators have 
criticized the existing rules of causation, however, and have pro-
posed creative suggestions for changing them to accommodate vic-
tims of mass toxic torts. 34 
The complexities generated by the competing conceptions un-
derlying the tort law have intimidated the courts from confronting 
and solving the dilemma and forced them into promoting settle-
ment. The analysis of Indian and U.S. tort law reveals the inability 
of both to deal adequately with the complexities involved in mass 
31 See id., which states: 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors 
are to be considered: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or 
chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; 
(f) and extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its danger-
ous attributes. 
:n See Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving Legal Scientific and Economic 
Burdens on the Chemical Victims, 7 HARV. El'iVTL. L. REV. 177 (1983). 
:u Compare Loe v. Lenhard, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961) (aerial crop-dusting held 
to be an ultrahazardous activity) with SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 902 
(1984) (appeal of trial court holding that aerial crop dusting is not ultrahazardous). 
34 See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of 
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (author proposes an aggregative approach in 
dealing with the causation problem in mass tort situations and suggests that the courts develop 
a public law vision of the tort system). See generally Note, InCTeased Risk of Disease from Hazardous 
Waste: A Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1985); Note, Pollution Share Liability: 
A New Remedy for Plaintiffs Injured by Air Pollutants, 9 COl.UM. J. ENVTL. L. 297 (1984); Note, 
Personal InjUry Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 797, 809-15 (1982-83); Trauberman, supra note 32. 
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tort situations and to effectively compensate victims for the violation 
of the right involved. Tort law is designed to deal with private risks 
which are discretely produced, localized, personally controlled, or 
of .natural origin and often immediate in their effects. The risks 
posed by the operations of MNCs, however, involve central or mass 
production, broad distribution, and temporally remote harm and 
are often outside the individual risk bearer's direct understanding 
and control. The effectiveness of tort law consequently diminishes 
and it ceases to offer effective deterrence, fair compensation, or a 
mechanism for resolving disputes. 
It may be argued, however, that despite its evident inadequa-
cies, tort law has developed and inspired legislative changes. In the 
U.S., for example, the tort law has instituted procedural innova-
tions, such as class actions, joinder of parties, and the formation of 
trust funds in settlements to deal with some of the remedial obstacles 
posed by mass disaster situations. In view of its innovative capacity, 
the tort law could presumably adopt a strict liability standard at the 
federal level to address violations of human rights caused by the 
ultrahazardous activities of MNCs. 
As long as only one legal culture is implicated, it may be possible 
to effectively peg corporations to a strict liability standard at the 
federal level. However, the structure and activities of MNCs tran-
scend national boundaries. Effective control over the activities of 
MNCs cannot be exercised without the cooperation of more than 
one sovereign state. The absence of this cooperation has resulted 
in conflicts between the national sovereignty of the home and the 
host countries.35 MNCs, motivated by making and increasing their 
35 The international community's recognition of the need to subject MNCs to interna-
tional control so as to avoid conflict and to attempt to create a consensus regarding their 
functioning and behavior, is reflected in various codes and guidelines. For example, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the "OECD") passed the Decla-
ration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in June 1976 annexing 
certain guidelines for multinational enterprises. Although not binding, the guidelines serve 
as an important source of reference and provide for a procedure to review and improve 
their effectiveness. See Kolvenbach, supra note 4, at 357. 
More significantly, the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group has labored 
over the formulation of a code of conduct for MNCs since 1977. The Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations is currently under negotiation. It is before the United Nations 
Commission of Transnational Corporations, but is actually being negotiated in the Intergov-
ernmental Working Group on the Code of Conduct. See Work Related to the Formulation 
of a Code of Conduct, Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of 
Conduct on its Fourteenth Session to the Commission on Transnational Corporations, 7 
U.N. ESCOR at 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.I0179 (1981). See also N.K. Sengupta, Legal Problems of 
Investment by International Companies in Developing Countries, 61-103, 19TH BIENNIAL CONFER-
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profits at the least risk to themselves and at the cost of endangering 
human rights, could therefore evade the standard by setting up a 
subsidiary in the foreign host country and employing the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens to avoid the jurisdiction of American 
courts.36 Their fluid nature, derived from their transnational char-
acter, enables MNCs to choose the legal regime which will most 
effectively accommodate their motives and protect their interests. 
To solve this dilemma, a host country might introduce legisla-
tion incorporating the doctrine of strict liability to govern the activ-
ities of MNCs functioning in their country. Although this is a plau-
sible solution, it would require a conscious, independent act on the 
part of each host government to enact such legislation. Unfortu-
nately, a government may not feel compelled to act unless it has 
experienced a "Bhopal type" situation. By then, it is too late. Bhopal 
has demonstrated the need for effective preventive action. 
Similarly, private international law remains unable to accom-
modate such international actors. It suffers from the same limita-
tions as domestic law insofar as it treats such entities as no different 
from a private person. It does not take into account the difference 
which power makes in their functioning. Their power is influenced 
not only by their international character, but also by their deeply 
ingrained profit instincts. Such instincts motivate decision-making 
and the assumption of risks at public expense, more particularly at 
the expense of human rights. Their decisions are facilitated by the 
fact that they are not bridled by anyone value system and can 
thereby avoid any restraints such a system may impose upon them. 
Furthermore, any argument based on the innovative capacity 
of tort law ignores the broader systemic dilemmas underlying the 
discussion of both United States and Indian tort law. The devel-
opment of tort law is determined by the market which is governed 
ENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION AT NEW DELHI (1984). The process is unique 
as it is the first time that the V. N. system has sought to create a regulatory apparatus to be 
imposed on entities which are not formally members of the V.N. body. This effort recognizes 
the international dimension of MNCs. 
Although the code remains in draft form, it nevertheless reflects the concern of the 
international community to subject MNCs to a uniform standard of behavior and also 
acknowledges that they have a public dimension which cannot be camouflaged by their 
traditional status as private actors. Recognition of this fact is expressed in clause 13 of the 
Draft Code, one of the few unanimously approved clauses, which asserts that MNCs have 
human rights obligations. See V.N. Doc. E/C. 10/1982/6, para. 13 which states "Transnational 
Corporations should/shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries 
in which they operate .... " 
36 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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by the ethic of economic efficiency. The model is defective insofar 
as it refuses to acknowledge that individuals are differently situated 
and are not afforded equal access to the market. It is a model 
dominated by those who have the wealth and institutional capacity 
to participate in decision-making processes. Therefore, even if pro-
cedural innovations, such as class actions, make the tort remedy 
more accessible to victims of mass disasters involving the operations 
of MNCs, they serve as mere palliatives. They will invariably prove 
inadequate because they are the products of a tort law based on a 
model which marginalizes the concerns of people existing at the 
grassroots level. The tort law does not protect marginalized groups 
from being subjected to risks imposed without their consent because 
it considers a certain amount of risk as inevitable in the industrial-
ization process and necessary for the promotion of economic effi-
ciency. Thus, the systemic dilemma which encumbers the tort law 
cannot be resolved through cosmetic reform. 
C. The Human Rights Alternative 
Because tort law is concerned with economic efficiency and is 
incapable of providing a uniform standard to govern the conduct 
and behavior of MNCs, it cannot provide effective solutions to the 
dilemmas posed by mass disasters. The question arises whether 
international law can provide the arena within which to formulate 
a better standard. Arguably, the international community could 
formulate a general standard to deal with the sorts of tortious acts 
committed by MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous activities and re-
sulting in large scale damage and incorporate it into the existing 
draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations.37 
The problem with this solution is that the Code has remained 
in draft form for over ten years. The main obstacle to its imple-
mentation is the controversy of whether the Code is self-executing 
and binding or requires a positive act on the part of each nation-
state to incorporate the provisions into its domestic law. If the Code 
is binding, its effectiveness will depend on the voluntary act of each 
participating state. Implementation of measures dealing with MNC 
accountability in mass disaster situations may require sufficient bar-
gaining power on the part of the host country in relation to the 
MNC to adopt these measures. In other words, power imbalances 
37 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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may inhibit some countries from being able to effectively incorpo-
rate such stringent measures against MNCs. 
The solution lies in the paradigmatic shift from a market model 
of development to one that places basic human needs at the center 
of the development process, ensuring that human autonomy, dign-
ity, and integrity are not infringed upon by more wealthy and 
powerful interests. This model requires the participation of mar-
ginalized groups in the decision-making processes. This participa-
tion can be effected through the discourse of human rights. The 
discourse provides a means by which marginalized groups can alter 
existing patterns of domination through communal dialogue. It 
enables those groups previously ignored in the developmental pro-
cess to discuss the goals of development and thereby influence its 
content and direction. The model is based on the notion that eco-
nomic efficiency is one of many values to be considered in evolving 
a development strategy. It does not prioritize economic efficiency 
to the exclusion of other values, but instead integrates it into a value 
system which is human-oriented. By providing space to those at the 
center of the development process, the model acknowledges the 
importance of human consent in the formulation and implemen-
tation of that process. 
In addition to compensating for the inadequacies existing in 
traditional tort law, the resort to human rights is important because 
human rights possess a powerful symbolic value. It raises the in-
trinsic worth of the human right to life from the level of private 
law discourse and concern with utilitarian calculations by recogniz-
ing the power and consequently the overwhelming capacity MNCs 
have to inflict harm. 
A model of development constructed through the discourse of 
human rights will influence the development and application of 
mechanisms designed to govern the conduct of MNCs in developing 
countries. If MNCs are compelled to function within the parameters 
of human rights, the law governing their conduct will develop ac-
cordingly. Developing through its acquaintance with the people and 
their circumstances, the law will be more sensitive and responsive 
to their environments, unlike a system developed within the model 
of economic efficiency, which is exclusive and oppressive. The en-
croachment of MNC activity on needs essential to survival prompts 
the construction of a human rights boundary within which the 
balancing of interests must take place. A model focusing on human 
development will furnish the minimum threshold of risk to which 
a community or individual may be exposed. This model will seek 
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to integrate the MNCs into a context which affords priority to 
human needs. In other words, technological capability and material 
output must be considered as only one of the development goals 
and considered in conjunction with the reduction of inequality, 
elimination of poverty, and satisfaction of basic needs. 
It is therefore proposed that the domestic structural imbalance 
can be rectified by, and an international consensus found in, the 
discourse of human rights. The discourse can provide marginalized 
groups with the means to participate in decision-making processes 
and resist exposure to risks previously imposed without their con-
sent. It also provides a uniform international standard to govern 
the conduct of MNCs operating in developing countries. 
V. THE RIGHT 
The right which prompts concern in relation to the conduct of 
MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous activities is the right to life. Tra-
ditionally the international community adhered to a narrow con-
struction of the right to life. Provisions in the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights have provided the basis for assertions that the right 
to life ought to be given a restrictive interpretation, mainly con-
cerning protection against intentional or arbitrary deprivation. 
The increased assertiveness of developing countries in the in-
ternational arena, the growing awareness as to the consequences of 
hazardous technology, and the association of power with actors 
other than the traditional state, have prompted a broader interpre-
tation of the right to life by the international community. The 
emergence of new actors equipped with economic power has am-
plified the range of harms which can be inflicted and has also 
exposed the right to life to threats not previously contemplated. 
These factors have urged a broader construction of the right to life 
so as to include social and economic rights. 
This recognition has been affirmed on several occasions by the 
United Nations. In December of 1982, the United Nations General 
Assembly passed a resolution expressing a firm conviction that all 
peoples and individuals have an inherent right to life and that the 
safeguarding of this foremost right is an essential condition for the 
enjoyment of the entire range of economic, social and cultural, as 
well as civil and political rights. 38 The Assembly requested that the 
38 G.A. Res. 371l89A, paras. 1 and 6, 37 GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 207-08, U.N. Doc. AI 
37/51 (1982). 
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Commission on Human Rights ensure the cardinal right of all in-
dividuals to life, liberty, security of person, and to live in peace. 39 
The Human Rights Committee in its report to the General 
Assembly in 1982 endorsed the need to adopt a broad interpretation 
of the right. 4!l The Committee examined the reports submitted by 
parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Commit-
tee's general comments based on this examination describe the right 
to life articulated in Article 6 of the Covenant as "the supreme right 
from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emer-
gency .... "41 The Committee adopted a broad approach to the 
inherent right to life and stated that the protection of this right 
required the states to adopt positive measures.42 
The right to life has become a part of customary international 
law. This recognition has been reinforced by the international com-
munity in the form of declarations, covenants, and resolutions, and 
has been both implicitly and explicitly adopted in most domestic 
jurisdictions. This development is significant insofar as it does not 
depend on the executory acts of individual nation-states to be in-
corporated into their existing law. Although a discussion of the 
enforcement of the right is beyond the scope of this paper, it should 
be noted that once the right is accepted as a part of customary 
international law, the procedural mechanisms for the enforcement 
of the right already exist in both India and the United States.43 The 
'') [d. By a resolution adopted in February 1982. the Commission had already expressed 
a firm conviction that all peoples and all individuals have an inherent right to life and to 
safeguard this foremost right is essential for the enjoyment of the entire range of economic, 
social and cultural, as well as civil and political rights. See Commission for Human Rights, 
Res. 198217 38 C.:--':. ESCOR Supp. (0:0. 2) at 112, U.N. Doc. EI1982/12 (1982). The Com-
mission reiterated its conviction in March 1983 stating that "for people in the world today 
there is no more important question than that of preserving peace and ensuring the cardinal 
right of every human being, namely, the right to life." See Res. 1983/43, 39 U.N. ESCOR 
Supp. (No.3) at 176, U.N. Doc. EI1983113 (1983). 
In See [!;enerally 37 C.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), C.N. Doc. AI:'l740 (1982). 
" [d. at 93. 
" [d. Clause 5 reads: 
5. Moreover, the Committee has noted that the right to life has been too often 
narrow!\' interpreted. The expression 'inherent right to life' cannot properly be 
understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that 
States adopt positive measures. In this connexion [sic J, the Committee considers that 
it would be desirable for States parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant 
mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate 
malnutrition and epidemics. 
4:\ In India, a plaintiff would be able to invoke the Supreme Court's extraordinary 
jurisdiction by way of an Article 32 writ petition to enforce her right to life. 
In the United States, a victim Illay he able to invoke section 1350 of the Alien Tort 
Claillls Act, which grants the federal district courts original jurisdiction over all actions by 
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existence of such domestic mechanisms is significant insofar as it is 
inadequate for the host government to bring an action on behalf of 
the victims against the MNC or the home government in an inter-
national forum because of the limited effectiveness of the interna-
tional mechanisms created to implement the laws of human rights. 
The domestic courts can therefore be used as agents for developing 
international human rights law. 
The evolution of the right to life in international law supports 
the argument that it can no longer be confined to a traditional 
conception associated with preventive detention, arbitrary arrest, 
and the death penalty.44 No conception of the right to life can ignore 
the social and economic dimensions of that right.45 A broad con-
an alien for a tort that has been committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States. The scope of section 1350 was discussed in Filartiga, which supports the 
argument that United States common law has incorporated the law of nations. including 
human rights. The case concerned an action brought under section 1350 of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act by two Paraguayan nationals against a third Paraguayan national in a U.S. district 
court for the alleged death by torture of a family member. The Court of Appeals, reversing 
the district court, recognized the emergence through international consensus of a universal 
law of human rights, which afforded substantive rights to individuals and placed limits on a 
state's treatment of its own individuals. In order for a plaintiff to have a cause of action, it 
was necessary for her to be able to point to a clear substantive rule of international law, and 
that rule must reflect a consensus among nations. The plaintiff succeeded in invoking the 
jurisdiction of American courts by establishing that freedom from torture was recognized as 
a part of customary international law. By granting jurisdiction in cases such as Filartiga, the 
courts are incorporating into law the principles enunciated in various international human 
rights treaties and accords. Rules become binding in international law when a substantial 
number of nations recognize such rules in practice. International treaties and accords on 
their own merit do not necessarily reflect accepted norms of international law as violations 
of such treaties and accords continue to occur. By granting jurisdiction in Filartiga, the court 
not only recognized the international consensus existing against torture, as reflected in treaties 
and accords, but it also established torture as a violation of international law. Since interna-
tional treaties and accords similarly reflect a consensus supporting the right to life, its 
infringement should be recognized as a violation of international law. In addition, the right 
not to be exposed to mortal danger is similar to torture, insofar as it is intrinsically associated 
with the right to life and concerns the very existence of life itself. Therefore, the right not 
to be exposed to mortal danger must also be deemed to fall within the scope of the right to 
life and its infringement recognized as a violation of international law. See generally Note, 
Enforcement of International Human Rights in the Federal Courts after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 67 
VA. L. REV. 1379 (1981). Although the far-reaching implications of the Filartiga case have 
been circumscribed by Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (1984), the basic 
premise articulated above remains unaltered. For an elaborate discussion on the effect of 
the Tel-Oren case on Filartiga, see Scobie, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human 
Rights in Federal Court, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1986). 
44 For further elaboration, see B.C. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND DIMENSIONS OF THE 
RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-32 (1985). 
45 See H. SIIUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 22-
29 (1980). Shue carries the argument even further by asserting that minimal economic 
security or subsistence is a separate and independent right and as basic a right as the right 
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struction has been endorsed by the Indian Supreme Court and 
supports the argument that MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous ac-
tivities owe a corresponding duty not to undermine the right to life 
by exposing individuals to mortal danger. 46 
The scope and ambit of the right to life and liberty contained 
in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution have been elaborated on in 
a number of Supreme Court decisionsY The Court has held that 
the quality of life is intrinsically linked to the right to life. In Francis 
Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, the Supreme Court gave 
full expression to the dimension of the right.48 The case involved 
the right of prisoners or drftenues to have interviews with their law-
yers, family members, and friends. In articulating the content of 
the right, the Supreme Court held that every act offending or 
impairing human dignity would constitute a deprivation of the right 
to life, and it would have to be in accordance with a reasonable, 
to physical security. Unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, 
adequate shelter, and minimal preventive public health care all come within the parameters 
of subsistence, although these are not rigidly defined. Nevertheless, the idea is to provide 
what is needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less 
normal length. He argues that no one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly 
protected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy and active life. 
Deficiencies in the means of subsistence can be just as fatal, incapacitating, or painful as 
violations of physical security. The resulting damage or death can as decisively prevent the 
enjoyment of any right as can the effects of security violations. 
Indeed, prevention of deficiencies in the essentials for survival is, if anything, more 
basic than prevention of violations or physical security. People who lack protection 
against violations of their physical security can, if they are free, fight back against 
their attackers or flee, but people who lack essentials, such as food, because of forces 
beyond their control, often can do nothing and are on their own utterly helpless. 
[d. at 25. 
4b Any reference to this right will be confined to the context of MNCs engaged in 
ultrahazardous activities which expose individuals to risks which are beyond their control 
and understanding and are imposed without their consent. Such reference is not intended 
to connote a broader meaning. 
47 Article 21 was originally interpreted very narrowly until the case of Maneka Gandhi 
v. Union of India, 1978 A.I.R. (S.C.) 597. Under this interpretation, the article embodied 
only that aspect of the rule of law which required that no one shall be deprived of their life 
or personal liberty without the authority of law. This interpretation was originally construed 
as a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as there was some law, 
which prescribed a procedure authorizing the deprivation of life or personal liberty, the 
requirements of Article 21 were satisfied. Maneka Gandhi added a new dimension to Article 
21 by requiring that the procedure must be reasonable, fair and just. This decision marked 
the starting point for the expansion of Article 21 in a direction which concerned itself with 
the quality of life. The decision in Maneka Gandhi established that Article 21 would forbid 
any act damaging, injuring, or interfering with the use of any limb or faculty of a person, 
either permanently or temporarily. 
4" 1981 A.I.R. (S.c.) 746. 
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fair, and just procedure established by law.49 The right includes 
more than just physical survival. It includes the right to live with 
human dignity which encompasses the bare necessities of life. 
Among these necessities are adequate nutrition, clothing and shel-
ter, facilities for reading, writing and expression in diverse forms, 
freely moving about, and mixing and commingling with fellow hu-
man beings. 50 
Concern for the quality of life was explicitly addressed in the 
limestone quarrying case which concerned the environment.51 This 
case was the first to come before the Indian Supreme Court involv-
ing issues relating to the environment and ecological balance. 52 
Several environmental groups petitioned the Court to stop the lime-
stone quarrying in the Doon Valley, a scenic region situated at the 
49Id. at 753. 
50 !d. Construing Article 21 for the purpose of the facts of this case, the Court referred 
to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the guarantee contained in 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court therefore 
demonstrated its concern with interpreting fundamental constitutional rights in conformity 
with international consensus. Both provisions are concerned with the right not to be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. See also State of 
Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 803 (where the Court struck down a law 
providing one rupee per month as subsistence allowance as illusory, meaningless and violative 
of Article 21). Id. at 808. A series of conflicting decisions followed on the issue of whether 
livelihood fell within the scope of Article 21. See Bapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1983 
A.I.R. (S.C.) 1073 (where the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the word "life" in 
Article 21 includes livelihood. It upheld the validity of the 1973 Andhra Pradesh Land 
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, rejecting the contention that the act deprived 
the livelihood of landholders and was therefore violative of Article 21); Neeraja Chaudhary 
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 A.I.R. (S.c.) 1099 (holding basic necessities, such as food, 
clothing and shelter, were implicitly covered by Article 21); T. Venkata Redd v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh, 1985 A.I.R. (S.c.) 724 (rejecting that the deprivation of a job constituted 
deprivation of the right to life and liberty); Fertilizer Corp. Kamagar Union Sindri v. Union 
of India, 1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 344 (holding that retrenchment of workmen did not amount to 
a violation of the right to carryon their occupation and that a right to work and earn 
livelihood is not a fundamental right). The issue was eventually considered by a larger bench 
of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986 A.I.R. (S.c.) 
180, 193, which held that the right to life included the right to livelihood and that the right 
was not confined to deprivation by enforcement of the death sentence except according to 
procedure established by law. "If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the 
constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be 
to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation." See also State of 
Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, 1986 A.I.R. (S.C.) 847 (where the Court expressly 
stated that the right to life under Article 21 embraced not only physical existence, but also 
quality of life. The case was concerned with the access to roads by the residents of a hilly 
area. The Court was of the opinion that access to roads was access to life itself and therefore 
fell within the realm of Article 21). 
51 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun and others v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh and others, 1985 A.I.R. (S.C.) 652. 
52 Id. at 653. 
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foothills of the Himalayas. Their claim was based on the right to 
life in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners alleged 
that private and state-run mines were endangering the valley's water 
resources and visual attractions, stripping hillsides of vegetation, 
and destroying the limestone belt that acted as a natural aquifer for 
the region. 53 The Court appointed an expert committee to investi-
gate the quarries and ordered the closure of several mines on the 
strength of its report. The Court expressly held that the people 
were entitled to live in a healthy environment, with minimal dis-
turbance of the ecological balance, without avoidable hazard to 
themselves and their cattle, homes, and agricultural land. The peo-
ple were also entitled to live without undue affectation of air, water, 
and environment.54 
This case law development indicates that the right to life has 
socio-economic dimensions, including a right to livelihood, to cer-
tain basic amenities, to a healthful environment, and to live with 
basic human dignity. The interpretation has therefore gone well 
beyond the very narrow scope traditionally accorded to this right. 
Many of the cases discussed above were brought about by individ-
uals belonging to or working at the grassroots level of society. The 
expansion of the right to life has therefore been brought about as 
a result of the participation of marginalized groups who, through 
the discourse of human rights, have influenced the context and 
construction of the right to life. 
In light of the development of the right to life in the interna-
tional and Indian contexts, the more restrictive interpretation ac-
corded to the right in the American context is no longer tenable 
nor determinative. There are, however, some instances where in-
dividuals and local communities have attempted to widen the scope 
and content of the right in the American context. This attempt has 
been influenced, in part, by increased exposure to the potentially 
hazardous effects of nuclear power, synthetic drugs, and chemicals 
possessing dangerous propensities, without the consent or partici-
pation of these individuals and communities in the decision-making 
process. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the life-
threatening potential of these developments, particularly when con-
trolled and exploited by powerful commercial entities and not the 
53Id. at 654. 
54 I d. at 656. 
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traditional state.55 For example, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envi-
ronmental Study Group, Inc.,56 residents of the area surrounding the 
planned nuclear power facilities, an environmental group, and a 
labor organization, challenged the constitutional validity of the lim-
ited liability provisions incorporated in the Price Anderson Act 
under the fifth amendment.57 The Act sought to limit the liability 
of a single nuclear power plant accident to $560 million.·os The 
Supreme Court, reversing the trial court, rejected the plaintiff's 
argument that the Act violated due process, stating that the amount 
available for compensation was not rationally related to the potential 
losses from an accident, and that the injuries are not provided with 
a satisfactory replacement for the common law right of recovery 
which was abrogated by the statute. The Court held, inter alia, that 
Congress could choose to limit liability in order to encourage the 
private development of atomic power. Nevertheless, the Court up-
held the findings of the district court, which recognized that the 
environmental and aesthetic consequences of thermal pollution of 
two lakes in the vicinity of the disputed plants as well as emission 
of non-natural radiation into the environment were adequate to 
satisfy the "injury in fact" standard necessary to give standing under 
the U.S. Constitution.59 
j5 The emerging judicial awareness has been brought about in part by the enactment of 
numerous nuclear and environmental protection laws designed to meet apprehensions pro-
voked by these developments. The enactments recognize the existence of a public interest 
or concern for the preservation of a healthy, uncorrupted, and safe environment. This 
concern has found its broadest expression outside the statutory regime in the recognition of 
an interest in environmental well-being as an important ingredient to the quality of life and 
as constituting sufficient injury filr standing purposes. For a more elaborate discussion as to 
the source of such an interest, see Burhman, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional 
Rights are Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 HASTINGS CON ST. LQ. 
57 (1985) (author argues that the cases represent the application of a common law public 
law model which enables the court to find an intangible non-economic injury where a 
constitutional injury is alleged); J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC 
LAW (1978) (author describes this model as a search for interests in society that are imbued 
with public value and says that the courts are left to determine whether the invasion of a 
particular interest can be stated in terms of a public value and hence constitute an injury). 
56 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
" StaL 576, 42 U.S.c. § 2210 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). 
5K 42 U.S.c. § 2014 (q). 
j'l Duke v. Carolina EnytL Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 86-91 (1978). The Court expressly 
left open the question whether the due process clause required the legislature to enact a 
compensatory scheme which either duplicated the recovery at common law or provided a 
reasonable substitute remedy. The Court held that the Price-Anderson Act created a fair 
and reasonable substitute. It found that the state tort law posed potential barriers which 
might make recovery under state law impossible. The Act provided a more efficient and 
certain avenue of compensation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court relied on congressional 
1990] MNC ACCOUNTABILITY 23 
The Duke Power case demonstrates the Court's willingness to 
recognize an interest in environmental well-being for the purposes 
of standing under the Constitution. The case did not address the 
threshold question of whether this interest was implicated in the 
constitutional right to life and liberty. Rather, the case was decided 
on due process grounds. Such an interest, arguably, is sufficient to 
give rise to a cause of action under tort law but would not implicate 
a constitutional right under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.5o 
The American courts have failed, however, to articulate the stan-
dards for determining whether a deprivation of a life and liberty 
interest has taken place. The United States Supreme Court's choice 
in Duke Power to base its decision on due process grounds, rather 
than deciding that the interest in environmental well-being was 
outside the scope of the right to life and liberty, is suggestive of the 
Court's openness to the argument that the interest might fall within 
this right. 
In any case, the stricter construction accorded by United States 
courts to the right to life does not undermine the expansion of the 
right to life in both international and other domestic contexts, where 
the right embraces interests which are social and economic in na-
ture. The broader interpretation represents an appreciation of the 
view that civil and political rights cannot exist without the simulta-
neous development of social and economic rights. This issue is an 
expression of a much larger debate in the field of human rights. 
The debate is concerned with the difference in approach to human 
rights between Western and non-Western nations. Western demo-
cracies promote and zealously protect the individual's freedom, 
rights, and dignity. Many developing countries base their approach 
on the perspective of the community and their unwillingness to 
allow the individual to exercise his or her rights in a way that 
jeopardizes the community.5l 
assurances stipulated in the Act that in the event of a nuclear accident, it would "take whatever 
action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences" of 
the incident. The amount was therefore viewed as a floor as opposed to a ceiling on recovery. 
60 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (where the Court. held that defamation was 
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under tort law, but did not implicate a liberty 
interest under the 14th amendment, and therefore, did not violate due process); Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (holding that false imprisonment of an individual for an eight 
day period may give rise to a claim under state tort law but gave no rise to a claim under 
the fourteenth amendment). 
61 See Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (1982). 
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These two views represent a duality in approach to human 
rights, in particular the right to life. This duality derives from the 
artificial distinction drawn between the individual and communitar-
ian conceptions of human rights. The assertion of an individual 
right necessarily implicates a communitarian value. This value is 
expressed in terms of pre-existing claims, interests, or needs, the 
relevance or significance of which resides in public consensus. It is 
this collective interest that constitutes the content and is intrinsic to 
the very existence of an individual human right. 
VI. STATE ACTION 
The question arises as to when the asserted right to life falls 
within the confines of private law and when it assumes a public 
character. Human rights are traditionally only enforceable against 
the state. The next two subsections analyze the development of the 
Indian and American doctrines of state action. 
A. American Doctrine of State Action 
In the United States, the presence of state action is a prereq-
uisite for the enforcement of fundamental rights under the Con-
stitution. In 1883 the Supreme Court fully addressed the doctrine 
for the first time in The Civil Rights Cases. The Court held that 
Congress was not authorized under the fourteenth amendment to 
prohibit discrimination by privately owned inns, conveyances, and 
places of amusement.62 The Court's holding required that Congress 
provide avenues of redress against the operation of state laws and 
the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these were 
subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.63 
By implication, a constitutional claim was not available to a victim 
of discrimination inflicted by a private person who could secure 
redress by filing an ordinary civil suit. 
In some situations, however, the courts have exhibited a will-
ingness to extend the doctrine to include some private actors. Pri-
vate actors that conduct themselves in a manner which resembles a 
state have been held accountable for the infringement of a consti-
tutional right. For example, the public function test articulated in 
62 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (the Supreme Court heard five cases all "founded on the first 
sections of the Act of Congress known as the Civil Rights Act" and reported them under 
one heading titled the "Civil Rights Cases"). 
63 [d. at 11. 
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Marsh v. Alabama has been employed by the United States Supreme 
Court to hold private entities liable for the violation of constitutional 
rights. 64 According to this test, functions that are intrinsically gov-
ernmental in nature constitute state action regardless of who per-
forms the function. 65 In the Marsh case, the Court held that the 
defendant corporation was prevented by the first amendment from 
prohibiting a Jehovah's Witness from speaking within the limits of 
its company town.66 The decision indicates that the town was subject 
to constitutional constraints because it was acting like a state. The 
characterization of the town in this manner illustrates that delega-
tion to a private entity does not enable a state to escape from its 
constitutional responsibilities. Subsequent cases have attempted to 
identify a category of responsibilities regarded as public.67 When 
private parties discharge these responsibilities pursuant to state au-
thorization, they are subject to the same constitutional norms ap-
plied to public officials. 
The willingness to treat private entities as public actors has 
been particularly pronounced in the context of the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The greater judicial inclina-
tion to find state action in the context of an equal protection claim 
suggests that the determination of a public function is correlated to 
the interest at stake. 68 
Furthermore, where the opportunity to increase profits at the 
expense of an individual's fundamental rights presents itself, the 
actor has been held responsible for its decision. In Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority, a publicly financed parking authority 
leased part of a parking facility to the defendant, a private restau-
64 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
6., See Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982) (criticizes the public function approach as inviting manipulation 
since it is not possible to define the essence or scope of such functions with any degree of 
specificity). 
66326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946). 
67 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345 (1974); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 
U.S. 308 (1968). 
68 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CO/,;STITUTIO/,;AL LAW 1688-1720 (1988) (suggesting that state 
action is determined according to the individual right asserted. Therefore, where the right 
enjoys a "preferred place" in the Constitution, a lesser showing of state action involvement 
is required to prove the act unconstitutional). The courts are therefore more willing to find 
state action for equal protection or first amendment rights as opposed to cases involving lack 
of procedural due process or the assertion of a countervailing right. See Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 395 U.S. 715 (1961); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
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rant which practiced racial discrimination.69 The United States Su-
preme Court held that the practice was in violation of the equal 
protection clause. 70 The Court found that the restaurant profited 
from the discrimination. 71 Burton lends support to the argument 
that where the opportunity to increase profits at the expense of an 
individual's fundamental rights presents itself, the actor must be 
held responsible for its decision. 
The state action doctrine was initially based on the respect 
accorded to individual liberty and the view that the concentration 
of power in the state presented the greatest risk to this liberty. The 
courts, however, have exhibited, to a limited extent, the shift of 
power from public to private hands, blurring the line of distinction 
originally represented by the doctrine. The courts have also exhib-
ited a tendency to treat private entities as public actors in certain 
circumstances. This tendency reveals the artificial distinction be-
tween public and private actors for the purpose of asserting fun-
damental rights and acknowledges that delegation of power has 
increased the capacity of the latter to inflict harm. No concrete body 
of rules has developed, however, to determine when governmental 
or private actors are deemed to be responsible for an alleged con-
stitutional violation. Nevertheless, the brief analysis of the criteria 
employed by the courts to justify the subjection of private actors to 
fundamental rights obligations72 must also be applied to MNCs to 
hold them accountable for their human rights obligations. 73 
69 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
70 Id. at 726. 
71 Id. at 724. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (where the 
government was not acquiring any added value from granting a liquor license to a club 
restricted to whites only). 
72 For a more detailed analysis of state action doctrine in the application of the American 
Constitution and the underlying tension between natural law and the positivist tradition, see 
Papers from the University of Pennsylvania, Law Review Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). In particular, see Friendly, Introduction: The Public-Private 
Penumbra - Fourteen Years Later, supra at 1289; Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote 
on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, supra at 1296; Goodman, Comment: Professor Brest on State Action 
and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, supra at 1331; Kennedy, The Stages of the 
Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, supra at 1349. 
73 It should be noted that in applying the "state action" doctrine, in the United States or 
in India, once a corporation is deemed to be a state it will be so characterized only for those 
activities considered public functions to which the constitutional limitation will apply, but not 
to those activities which are private and outside the public function context. Similarly, the 
argument in this paper is confined to the character of MNCs as state or quasi-sovereign for 
the purpose of enforcement of human rights. 
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B. Indian Law on State Action 
The extension of the state action doctrine has been further 
developed in the Indian context. The tendency to bring more and 
more activity within the reach of constitutional limitations has been 
even more pronounced than in the United States. India is an ex-
tensively regulatory state and the courts have served as an effective 
check on government arbitrariness. This process has been facilitated 
by the special writ jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court of 
India by article 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights contained 
in Part III of the Indian Constitution. 74 The provision enables 
parties to directly approach the highest court to seek invalidation 
of legislation or the setting aside of an administrative order that 
contravenes a fundamental right. The writ jurisdiction, being rela-
tively expeditious and inexpensive, is invoked whenever possible. 
The expansion of the state action doctrine has occurred 
through the development of the scope and ambit of article 12 of 
the Indian Constitution. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board jaipur v. 
Mohan Lal, the Indian Supreme Court held that the Rajasthan 
Electricity Board was an authority within the meaning of "other 
authorities" in article 12.75 The majority pointed out that the ex-
pression included all constitutional and statutory authorities on 
whom powers are conferred by law. It was further held that any 
body of persons that had authority to issue directions, the disobe-
71 Article 32 provides: 
(I) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto 
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the 
rights conferred by this Part. 
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses 
(I) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the 
local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme 
Court under clause (2). 
(4) The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as 
otherwise provided for by this Constitution. 
A similar power is conferred on the High Courts to issue certain writs for the enforcement 
of rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose, by Article 226 of the Constitution. 
75 1967 A.I.R. (S.c.) 1857. Article 12 of the Constitution of India states: 
In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes the 
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of 
each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or 
under the control of the Government of India. 
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dience of which would be punishable as a criminal offense, would 
come within the meaning of "State" for the purposes of article 12.76 
In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, Justice Mathew articulated a 
more elaborate test. 77 The state could no longer be understood as 
a "coercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority," but 
had to be perceived as a service corporation. 78 He stated that the 
emerging principle was that a public corporation is an instrument 
or agent of the state, and thus subject to the same constitutional 
limitations as the state. 79 This principle applied where the corpo-
ration was a creation of the state and there was an existence of 
power in the corporation to invade the constitutional rights of the 
individua1.80 
The doctrine of agency and state instrumentality was adopted 
by Justice Bhagwati in Ramana D. Shetty v. International Airport Au-
thority.sl Justice Bhagwati identified several criteria for evaluating 
the existence of state action. 82 The Indian Supreme Court held that 
it was not possible to formulate an exhaustive test to adequately 
determine whether a corporation was acting as an instrumentality 
or agency of the state.S3 Although a degree of state control would 
not in and of itself be determinative of the issue, if such control 
was combined with state financial support and an unusual degree 
of control over management and policies of the corporation, the 
operation might be characterized as state action. 84 The Court noted 
that it should not be confined to traditional conceptions of govern-
ment functions when determining if a corporation is performing a 
governmental function. 85 The Court cited with approval the view 
76 1967 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1863. Shah, J., concurring, favored a broader interpretation. He 
held that constitutional or statutory authorities would fall within the meaning of the expres-
sion if vested with sovereign powers, such as making binding rules and regulations. Id. at 
1864. 
771975 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1331. 
78Id. at 1349. 
79Id. at 1357. 
"n Id. 
81 1979 A.I.R. (S.c.) 1628. 
82Id. at 1641-42 (the criteria included (i) whether there is any state financial assistance 
and if so the magnitude of that assistance, (ii) any other form of state assistance, either usual 
or extraordinary, (iii) the nature and extent of the state's control over the management and 
policies of the corporation, (iv) the monopoly status conferred or protected by the State, and 
(v) the nature of the functions carried out by the corporation). 
83Id. at 1642. 
84Id. at 1640. Bhagwati, J., states that "[ilt is the aggregate or cumulative effect of all 
the relevant factors that is controlling." Id. at 1642. 
85Id. at 1640. 
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expressed by Justice Mathew in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, that 
"institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or perform-
ing public functions are by virtue of the nature of the functions 
performed, government agencies. Activities which are too funda-
mental to the society are by definition too important not to be 
considered government functions."86 This doctrinal approach was 
unanimously affirmed in Ajay Rasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi. 87 
These doctrinal developments have culminated in M.e. Mehta 
v. Union of India (hereinafter the Shriram decision),88 in which the 
Indian Supreme Court considered the true scope and content of 
articles 21 and 32 of the Indian Constitution.89 The issue of state 
action arose in the context of determining the standard of care 
owed by large enterprises engaged in the manufacture and sale of 
hazardous products and the basis on which damages should be 
assessed. 
The case arose as a result of a leakage of oleum gas from a 
unit of the Shriram Foods and Fertilizer Industries, which affected 
several workers and the general public. The leak occurred while a 
writ petition was pending seeking closure of certain units of the 
company which purportedly posed a health hazard. The issue of 
whether the Court could entertain applications for compensation 
for loss or damage resulting from the leak, even though the peti-
tioner did not amend the writ to include the claim for compensation, 
was referred to a larger bench of five judges as it involved a sub-
stantial question of law. The Court held that adopting a hypertech-
nical approach in dealing with such applications for the enforce-
ment of a fundamental right to life would defeat the ends of justice. 
The Court considered the scope and ambit of article 32 of the 
Indian Constitution. Relying on Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of 
India,90 the Court stated that it was well settled that the article did 
not merely confer power to issue a direction order or writ for 
enforcement of the fundamental rights: 
[I]t also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect 
the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this 
Court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the 
B6 [d. (quoting 1975 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1331). 
B7 1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 487. 
BB 1987 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1086. 
B9 For text of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, see supra note 74. Article 21 of the 
Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law." 
90 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802. 
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power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies de-
signed to enforce the fundamental rights. 91 
The Court proceeded to consider the question of whether ar-
ticle 21, a fundamental right, was available against a private cor-
poration engaged in an activity that had the potential to affect the 
life and health of the people. According to article 12, fundamental 
rights enshrined in chapter III of the Constitution are only available 
against the "state." The Court therefore had to determine the scope 
of article 12 of the Constitution to ascertain whether the defendant 
fell within the definition of "state." The Court was able to extract a 
set of criteria that had evolved through the case law, by which a 
corporation could be termed "other authority" under article 12.92 
Referring to a passage in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, the Indian 
Court emphasized that: 
"Where constitutional fundamentals vital to the maintenance of 
human rights are at stake, functional realism and not facial 
cosmetics must be the diagnostic tool, for constitutional law must 
seek the substance and not the form."93 [It followed therefore,] 
if the government acting through its officers is subject to certain 
constitutional limitations it must follow a fortiori that the gov-
ernment acting through the instrumentality or agency of a cor-
poration should be equally subject to the same limitations.94 
The manner by which the corporation came into being was held to 
be immaterial for the purposes of determining whether the cor-
poration was an instrument of state. The relevant inquiry was not 
how it had been brought into existence, but rather why it had been 
brought into existence.95 
The Indian Supreme Court proceeded to examine the peti-
tioner's arguments whether the defendant, a private actor, came 
within the ambit of article 12. The Court's discussion focused on 
the government's policy indicating that the activity of producing 
chemicals and fertilizers was deemed to be of vital public interest. 
The state should carry out such an activity although private cor-
porations were permitted to supplement the state effort. Although 
it was found that the government did not control the internal man-
agement policies of the defendant company, it exercised functional 
91 1987 A.I.R. (s.c.) at 1098. 
92 !d. at 1093-94. However, the Court refused to decide the question in this case. [d. at 
1097. 
93 [d. at 1094 (quoting 1981 A.I.R. (S.c.) 487). 
94 [d. 
95 [d. 
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control. This control was exhibited by the government's control over 
those activities of the defendant which could jeopardize public in-
terest. The Court held that the defendant was engaged in the 
manufacture of a chemical deemed to be of vital public interest. As 
the chemical was admittedly dangerous to life, the defendant was 
engaged in an activity which had the potential to invade the right 
to life of a large section of the population.96 Therefore, the Court 
held that it was not only the state's power as an economic agent, 
economic entrepreneur and allocator of economic benefits that 
should be subject to the limitations of fundamental rights. 97 The 
Court was of the view that a private corporation under the func-
tional control of the state, engaged in an activity hazardous to the 
health and safety of the community and imbued with public interest 
could in theory also be subject to the same limitations, but stopped 
short of deciding the question.98 
The Indian Supreme Court has clearly expanded the scope of 
articles 12 and 21 of the Indian Constitution to create respect for 
human rights within the corporate structure. The universalization 
of these principles will furnish an appropriate and uniform stan-
dard to govern the conduct and behavior of MNCs in developing 
countries, and, more particularly, to deal with the dilemmas con-
fronted by courts in mass disaster situations. 
C. MNCs as State Actors 
Indian and American state action doctrines provide an effective 
analogy for characterizing MNCs as state actors or quasi-sovereigns. 
The various criteria articulated in the application of the state action 
doctrine in both Indian and American docLrincs are ways of rec-
ognizing one common feature, namely, the existence arid concen-
tration of power in the concerned entity. This feature endows the 
entity with the ability to invade the rights of the individual. When 
such an ability exists, the entity must be subject to the same onerous 
responsibility attached to a state, to ensure the respect and protec-
tion of such rights. MNCs fall within this description as private 
business entities inherently affecting the public interest. 
MNCs constitute the nucleus of the international business 
world, encouraging a growing interdependence among nation-
96Id. at 1096. 
97 Id. at 1097. 
YM Id. 
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states. Their function as economic agencies and the allocators of 
economic benefits parallel what are regarded as traditional state 
functions. Therefore, the carrying out of functions which are in-
trinsically governmental is sufficient to characterize MNCs as states 
or quasi-sovereigns regardless of the fact that they have traditionally 
been regarded as private entities. Their public nature is further 
enhanced by their organizational structure which transcends na-
tional boundaries and thus blurs tht" lint' distinguishing them from 
public actors. The overwhelming association of MNCs with the 
scientific and technological progress of developing countries impli-
cates them in the public interest of such countries and also contrib-
utes to their quasi-sovereign status. 
In view of MNCs' acquisition of the attributes of a state, they 
ought to be subject to human rights obligations. They have emerged 
as powerful actors, endowed with the ability to inflict harm. Human 
rights which were designed to protect against abuses of power by a 
state must not be emasculated as a result of the delegation of that 
power.99 
VII. LIABILITY 
International human rights law has traditionally been confined 
to intentional violations by state actors. The accountability of MNCs 
endowed with the power to infringe human rights, however, must 
be determined according to the impact of the violation. Several 
jurisdictions have recognized that the effect of a violation of a 
constitutional right is sufficient to hold an actor accountable without 
requiring proof of intention. lOO The Indian Supreme Court in the 
Shriram case confronted the problem of attributing intention to a 
corporate entity by conferring an absolute non-delegable duty on 
entities engaged in ultrahazardous activities. 101 By holding such 
"'I See H. SHUE. supra note 45. Shue argues that certain minimal demands for basic rights 
can be made on "the rest of humanity" in this regard, which would include MNCs as they 
have become as powerful as nation states. In particular, that MNCs may not ignore the 
universal duty to avoid depriving persons of their basic rights nor may they interfere with 
actions, including government actions, taken to fulfill any kind of duty correlative to a basic 
right. Shue further argues that such rights are not confined to enforcement against members 
of one's own society, but are assertable against persons generally. [d. at 131-52. 
11i() See Re Canadian National Railway Co. and Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
147 D.L.R. 3d 312 (l9R3), (aiI'd Re Bhinder and Canadian National Railway Co., 23 D.L.R. 
4th 481 (1985)); Re Ontario Human Rights Comm'n and Simpson-Sears Ltd., 13R D.L.R. 3d 
133 (l9R2). 
101 1987 A.l.R. (S.c.) at 1099. 
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actors absolutely liable for the harm resulting from their operations, 
the Court implicitly recognized the legitimacy of impact analysis in 
holding such actors accountable for fundamental human rights vi-
olations. The Indian Court recognized the limitations of traditional 
tort law in providing a standard that deals effectively with mass 
disasters resulting from industries engaged in ultrahazardous activ-
ities. \02 The Court found that the rule in Rylands v. Fletrher was not 
designed to deal with a modern industrial society.103 This rule ,iid 
not contemplate the consequences and was thus inappropriate in a 
society where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries had 
become an integral aspect of the process of development. 104 There-
fore, the rule could not afford any guidance in creating a standard 
of liability which was consistent with constitutional norms and the 
needs of present day socio-economic structure. 105 
The Indian Supreme Court set out the following principle of 
liability to govern enterprises engaged in ultrahazardous or inher-
ently dangerous activities: 
We would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged 
in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results 
to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such 
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting for exam-
ple, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely 
liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident 
and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which 
operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under 
the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.lo6 
The Court held that while the enterprise was engaged in such 
activity, the enterprise owed an absolute and non-delegable duty to 
the community to ensure that no harm resulted to any individual 
as a result of the ultrahazardous and inherently dangerous nature 
of the activity undertaken. The enterprise was not entitled to a 
defense that it had taken all reasonable care and the harm occurred 
102Id. 
103 19 L.T.R. 220 (1868). This case established the principle that a person who for his 
own purpose brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief 
must keep it at his peril. If he fails to do so, and it escapes that person is prima facie liable 
for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. 
Accordingly, persons who kept and collected anything which they had brought on to 
their land which was likely to do harm would be liable to compensate for the damage caused 
by the escape of such thing. This rule applied only to non-natural users of the land. 
IlH 1987 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1098. 
105Id. at 1098-99. 
106 /d. at 1099. 
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without any negligence on its part. Absolute liability was part of the 
social cost of carrying out such dangerous activity. The Court fur-
ther noted that the enterprise alone has the resources to discover 
and guard against hazards or dangers posed by its activities and to 
warn against its potential hazards. 107 
An absolute duty must be imposed on MNCs engaged in ultra-
hazardous activities as they are in the position to undermine the 
very existence of life itself. It is necessary to sustain the essential 
ingredients of the basic right to life. Dereliction of the duty not to 
expose individuals to mortal danger essentially obstructs perfor-
mance of this right. 
Furthermore, MNCs cannot shift their obligations to the local 
government. Where an MNC is situated in the same position as a 
state to inflict harm or threaten the substance of the right, its duty 
to observe such a right should be commensurate with its position. 
No exception should be permitted to this rule as it will merely 
perpetuate the notion that extrinsic circumstances should determine 
the value of human life as opposed to its intrinsic worth. Only the 
MNC is in the position to determine the ultrahazardous propensities 
of their activities. It is only on the basis of information supplied by 
MNCs that local governments license their activities. 
Thus, the application of a principle of absolute liability to 
MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous activities recognizes the culpabil-
ity of the MNC to the same extent as if the violation had been 
intentionally committed. lOS Without impact-based analysis, any at-
tempt to render MNCs accounttble for human rights violations will 
be futile. 
VIII. THE REMEDY 
The following section will focus on the remedy for violation of 
a human right resulting from ultrahazardous activities conducted 
by MNCs. The discussion will exemplify how human rights can be 
effectively secured against MNCs and also deter MNCs from inflict-
107 [d. 
108 See The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), which uses the language of obligation, stating that 
parties to the Covenant undertake to "respect" and "ensure" the rights stated therein to all 
individuals. The fact that MNCs are not parties does not detract from the force of the 
argument. The right to life existed before it had ever been articulated in the Covenant or 
any other document. 
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ing future harm. First to be discussed is the acceptance of damages 
as a remedy for the violation of a fundamental human right by 
courts in India as well as the United States. Second will be the 
introduction of a punitive measure of damages for remedying such 
violations, thereby acknowledging the value and content of the right 
concerned. 
A. American Law 
In the United States, the federal courts have fashioned a dam-
age remedy for the violation of a constitutional right regardless of 
whether such a remedy has been explicitly sanctioned by Congress. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,I09 
the plaintiff brought a federal action for damages alleging that the 
defendants had engaged in an illegal search and seizure resulting 
in "great humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering." 1 10 The 
United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment was 
a sufficient basis for finding a right to recovery in this instance. lll 
It emphasized the individual's personal injury l12 and her entitle-
ment to any available remedy for violation of the wrong commit-
ted. 113 It awarded damages notwithstanding the absence of explicit 
congressional action authorizing the remedy. The Court held that 
the judiciary had a particular responsibility to assure the vindication 
of constitutional interests. 114 
In Carlson v. Green,ll5 the United States Supreme Court went 
so far as to permit the plaintiff to seek damages directly under the 
eighth amendment, notwithstanding the availability of a congres-
sionally authorized remedy under the Federal Torts Claim Act 
(FTCA).1l6 The Court held that the FTCA was not intended to be 
a substitute remedy for a Bivens action. ll7 Several factors weighed 
in favor of allowing the plaintiff to pursue a Bivens action which 
109 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
110 [d. at 389-90. 
III [d. at 394-95. 
112 [d. at 395. 
113 [d. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 2 U.S. 678, 684 (1945». 
114 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407. See also Davis v. Pasman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (wherein 
the award of damages was held to be an appropriate remedy for an alleged due process 
violation under the fifth amendment). 
115 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
116 [d. at 19-23. The Federal Tort Claims Act is found at 28 U.S.C. 2680 (h) (1974). 
117 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 18-20. 
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demonstrated the Court's willingness to recognize the value of the 
concerned right to the individual where neither common law nor 
statute provided an effective remedy. I IS 
These cases reflect the emerging judicial approach to award 
02f;,a~rf' ffll" viobtior~~, ',IF ,:onstitutional rights in cases where no 
other efi;2c:i'ie cor;:mon law or statutory remedy exists and there 
are no special factors which counsel against the judicial creation of 
a remedy.lli) 
The second issue of the amount of damages the Court is willing 
to award has been addressed in a number of cases. Some recent 
cases reflect the underlying tension between traditional tort con-
cepts of compensation and a more expansive view of compensation 
for constitutional violation. 120 Punitive damages have been awarded 
II" /d, at 18-23. The court stated that a Bivens remedy was a more effective deterrent 
than the FTC A because it was available against an individual for unconstitutional behavior. 
Furthermore, a claim for punitive damages was available under a Bivens action, but forbidden 
under the provisions of the FTCA. A plaintiff was also entitled to a jury trial under a Bivens 
action which was unavailable under the FTCA. Finally, the Bivens action was based on uniform 
federal laws whereas the FTCA was tied to state laws. [d. at 20-23. See also Rotenberg, Private 
Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs - A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and Process, 14 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 77 (1986). 
119 The reasoning in the Bivens line of cases is subject to a special context exception. See 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (where the plaintiff, a federal civil service employee, was 
denied a damage action brought under the Constitution alleging violation of first amendment 
rights by his superiors. Although the available congressional remedy was not equally effective, 
the plaintiff's claim was disallowed due to the "special context" of Congress' long involvement 
with the federal civil service. Nevertheless, although the relief was not complete, it was held 
to be adequate). See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (decided at the same time; 
the question was whether enlisted military personnel may sue to recover damages from 
superior officers for injuries suffered as a result of violation of a constitutional right. The 
complaint was disallowed on the ground that the special context exception applied. A soldier 
and his or her superior officer enjoy a unique relationship which would be undermined by 
making officers personally liable to those they are supposed to command). [d. at 304. See also 
Jones v. Reagan, 696 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1983). For an analysis of the effect of Chappell and 
Bush on the Bivens action, see Steinman, Backing off' Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat 
for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984). 
1"0 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) in which the Court, in the absence of actual 
injury, allowed only nominal damages. This holding implicitly limited recovery for depriva-
tion of procedural due process to recovery for actual injury as a result of the deprivation. 
In the aftermath of Carey, the question remained whether substantial deprivation was similarly 
limited. See Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986), where 
the Court held that damages could be recovered for a substantial deprivation of a constitu-
tional right when tied to an injury actually suffered. The case arose from a dispute concerning 
course material used by a tenured seventh grade science teacher in a Memphis public school. 
The plaintiff claimed compensatory and punitive damages for being deprived of liberty 
without due process and also claimed violation of his first amendment rights. The Supreme 
Court reversed the district court, which upheld the claim, and remanded it for consideration 
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in tort law when there has been a showing of actual injury or real 
harm.121 Some constitutional cases, however, represent the view that 
although compensation for actual injury may be sufficient to deter 
future violations, this is not always an appropriate remedy for con-
stitutional violations. 
In Monroe v. Pape, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, 
claimed that the special kind of constitutional violation in section 
1983 required a different remedy and a significantly higher level 
of appropriate compensation than do ordinary torts by private cit-
izens.122 He stated that the legal history of section 1983 indicated 
that the constitutional deprivation "is significantly different from 
and more serious than a violation of a state right .... "123 Thus, the 
American courts have allowed the award of punitive damages, 
thereby recognizing the value of the right violated and simulta-
neously having a deterrent effect. 124 
B. Indian Law 
Until recently, damage awards were not contemplated in the 
exercise of the Indian Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Dam-
ages were not traditionally awarded against the state for violation 
of a fundamental right, partly due to the institution of the writ 
remedy which does not contemplate the granting of damage awards 
for the violation of fundamental rights, and also to the traditional 
common law notion that the "king can do no wrong."125 
of the damage award. [d. at 2546. It found that there was no acceptable justification for the 
jury instruction authorizing damages based on abstract social and historical significance of a 
constitutional right. [d. at 2543-44. Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, 
J.J., concurring, stated that the violation of a constitutional right resulting in non-monetary 
injuries, and not falling within traditional tort conceptions of emotional distress, in proper 
cases may constitute a compensable injury. Memphis School Dist., 106 S. Ct. at 2547 (Marshall, 
J., concurring). The case rejected any notion of awarding damages based on the abstract 
value of the constitutional right. Unfortunately, the holding leads to an unwarranted dis-
tinction between a public constitutional wrong, such as environmental well-being, and a 
private constitutional wrong, where actual injury can be shown. See Rotenberg, supra note 
118 at 87 (where Rotenberg argues that the Court could easily conclude that every consti-
tutional wrong "is a substantial or significant or meaningful injury to the person affected"). 
121 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,45-48 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 
(1980). 
122 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
123 [d. 
124 Car/son, 446 U.S. at 21-22. 
125 This notion embraced two ideas, namely (i) the king was above the law and could not 
be held to wrongdoing by traditional legal norms and (ii) the king was a perfect embodiment 
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The Indian Supreme Court has taken some steps toward en-
larging the scope of remedies available in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction. In several recent cases concerned with the enforcement 
of article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the Indian Supreme Court 
has implicitly recognized its premier place in the Constitution and 
acknowledged the need to develop remedies consistent with the 
expanding content of the article. The Court therefore attempted 
to develop a compensatory remedy to effectively vindicate the in-
dividual's fundamental right to life and liberty and deter the state 
and other powerful entities from violating it. 126 
In these cases, the Court recognized that in the absence of an 
adequate civil remedy founded directly upon the violation of a 
constitutional right, the only remedy available to the plaintiffs would 
have been tort damages pursuant to a civil suit against the state or 
its officers. By using its original jurisdiction to award compensation, 
the Court highlighted the content and value of the right violated 
as well as the responsibility of the actor for the violation of the 
right. 127 As Chief Justice Chandrachud stated in Rudal Sah: 
[I]n these circumstances the refusal of the court to pass an order 
of compensation in favour of the petitioner [would] be doing 
mere lip service to his fundamental right to liberty which the 
State Government has also grossly violated. Article 21 which 
guarantees the right to life and liberty would be denuded of its 
of the law. However, the "petition of right" procedure introduced for suing the king dem-
onstrated that traditional procedure was not sufficient for bringing the king back to perfection 
should he fall below the standard. See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign 
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963). 
12" See Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar, 1983 A.l.R. (S.c.) 1086, where the Court awarded 
compensation for the State's gross violation of the petititoner's fundamental right to life and 
personal liberty under Article 21. The petitioner was found to have been illegally detained 
without statutory justification for 14 years after being acquitted from certain criminal charges. 
The Court directed the State to pay the petitioner monetary compensation. The case marked 
the first occasion on which the Supreme Court used its original jurisdiction under Article 32 
to create new remedies where such remedies were considered indispensable to the vindication 
of fundamental rights. See also Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1986 
A.l.R. (S.c.) 494, where it was found that a member of the legislative assembly of Jammu 
and Kashmir was arrested and detained for the malicious purpose of preventing him from 
attending an assembly session. The Supreme Court passed strictures and condemned the 
authoritarian acts of the police. The government was held responsible for the arrest and 
directed to pay the petitioner compensation. 
127 For a more elaborate discussion on the expansion of remedies in the exercise of the 
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, see Patel, New Dimension of Law Restitutive justice, 
A.l.R.J. 49 (1987). 
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significant content if the power of this Court were limited to 
passing orders of release from illegal detention. 12s 
39 
Chandrachud held that the violation of the right could reasonably 
be prevented and the mandate of article 21 duly complied with by 
directing its violators to make a payment of monetary compensa-
tion. 129 
It was not until the Shriram case, however, that the Supreme 
Court of India forged a remedy fully commensurate with the value 
and content of the right being asserted. The Court recognized the 
need to offer more than a palliative to victims of powerful entities 
in the position to disregard basic human rights through the asser-
tion of their power and restore the right to life to its position of 
primacy among human rights. The Shriram case also proposes a 
punitive measure of damages insofar as it is based On the defen-
dant's capacity to pay.130 The Court appreciated the value of the 
right affected by the violation. It therefore articulated a punitive 
measure of damages against a state actor. Actual or exemplary 
damages, traditionally awarded in tort cases, were not deemed by 
the Court to be sufficient compensation for the violation of a human 
right. 131 The damage measure had to have a deterrent effect. 
Therefore, the Court held that the measure of compensation should 
be correlated to the defendant's magnitude and capacity to pay.132 
Damages should be recoverable from MNCs for the infringe-
ment of a human right resulting from the ultrahazardous nature 
of their activity. The trends in both American and Indian law en-
dorse this approach. In addition, the award must be punitive in 
nature if it is to have a deterrent effect and highlight the value of 
the right which is being infringed. 133 
128 Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar, 19S3 A.l.R. (S.c.) at 10S9. 
129 See also Sebastian Hongary v. Union of India, 19S4 A.l.R. (S.c.) 1026; Anna Appa 
Sutar v. State of Maharashtra, 19S6 MAH. L.J. 851. 
130 1987 A.l.R. (S.c.) at 1099. 
131 Id. at 1099-1100. 
132Id. See also Dias and Baxi, Shriram judgment, Companies "Absolutely Liable" jar Industrial 
Hazards, BUSINESS INDIA, .Ian. 12-25, at 43 (l9S5) (where the former Chief Justice Bhagwati 
discussed the Shriram decision and the reasoning underlying the principle of damages artic-
ulated by the Court). 
m It follows that the value of the right should not be undermined through the application 
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. If capacity 
to pay is the determining factor in securing relief for the violation of a human right, the 
plaintiff must have unimpeded access to the defendant's assets sufficient to satisfy any decree 
awarded in her favor. The author would propose that the principle of damages based on 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The underlying concern throughout this article has been to 
expose the legal vacuum existing at both the domestic and inter-
national levels in governing the behavior and conduct of a powerful 
international entity. The multinational corporation has accumulated 
power and influence equipping it with the capacity to inflict as much 
harm as the nation-state, if not more. Yet, no mechanism exists to 
contain its ability to violate fundamental human rights. The reluc-
tance to subject these actors to human rights obligations has been 
shown to be unacceptable and without foundation. MNCs must be 
held accountable for the wanton disregard exhibited for the value 
of life in developing countries. They cannot be permitted to export 
harm to other countries, and reap the full profit of their ventures 
without liability in an equal measure for the resulting damage. They 
must no longer be permitted to evade their responsibilities by re-
treating behind anachronistic doctrines and narrow constructions 
that have governed these powerful, ostensibly private entities and 
precluded any consideration of human rights. Human rights law 
can cure the existing defect in the law by supplying a common and 
acceptable regime for all parties. 
In the context of MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous activities, 
the true scope and content of the right to life must be recognized 
and should not be fragmented by different value systems. Affluence 
or poverty must not overwhelm the intrinsic worth of the right. If 
the existence or expendability of life were determined by such 
external measures of value, it would impoverish human rights gen-
erally, and more specifically, negate the very concept of the right to 
life. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the progeny 
of an international community aspiring for homogeneity and unity. 
It was an expression of the recognition of the interdependence of 
nations. The judiciary must adopt the spirit of this expression and 
not cling to narrow, parochial definitions in the arena of human 
rights. It must recognize that in transnational situations the inter-
pretation of these rights must be broad enough to accommodate 
different value systems. Human rights do not and ought not give 
credence to a dual system of values. 
Finally, as MNCs engaged in ultrahazardous activities are en-
dowed with an inordinate capacity to inflict harm and cause death, 
capacity to pay be coupled with the traditional rule of law permitting a plaintiff to sue the 
defendant where the defendant resides. See Indian Code of Civil Procedure § 20. 
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the subjection of these actors to human rights obligations ought no 
longer be contingent upon the judicial manipulation of legal fic-
tions, such as the state action doctrine. The power of these entities 
alone ought to suffice. Human rights law is the only force which 
can supply the legal framework to bridle the power of MNCs that 
transcend national boundaries and cannot be held accountable to 
any domestic legal regimes. The vindication of the value of human 
life, as a meaningful and concrete right in individual lives, demands 
no less. 134 
134 See Laski, Towards a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COM-
MENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 78, 84 (UNESCO, ed., 1949), who stated: 
Under circumstances such as these, the issue of a Declaration of Rights would 
be a grave error of judgment unless it set out deliberately to unify, and not to 
separate, men [sic] in their different political societies. It must therefore, emphasize 
the identities, and not the differences, in the competing social philosophies which 
now arouse such passionate discussion. But even then it will have little value, even 
as a general expression of aspirations, unless it is both concrete enough and definite 
enough in character to seem clearly to possess the practical merit of being capable 
of application by the effort of those to whom it is addressed. It must, this is to say, 
be a programme and not a sermon. It must be a criterion of the actual practices of 
existing political countries, so framed that it is felt to be a living canon of their 
validity. 
